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Trends in Security Information
The HSD Trendmonitor is designed to provide access to relevant content on various subjects in the safety and security domain, to identify relevant developments and to connect knowledge and organisations. The safety and security domain encompasses a vast number of subjects. Four relevant taxonomies (type of threat or opportunity, victim, source of threat and domain of application) have been constructed in order to visualize all of these subjects. The taxonomies and related category descriptions have been carefully composed according to other taxonomies, European and international standards and our own expertise.
In order to identify safety and security related trends, relevant reports and HSD news articles are continuously scanned, analysed and classified by hand according to the four taxonomies. This results in a wide array of observations, which we call ‘Trend Snippets’. Multiple Trend Snippets combined can provide insights into safety and security trends. The size of the circles shows the relative weight of the topic, the filters can be used to further select the most relevant content for you. If you have an addition, question or remark, drop us a line at info@securitydelta.nl.
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How violation of cyberspace affects national security
Digital processes intertwined with, and dependent on, cyberspace
All our digital processes are strongly intertwined with and dependent on global cyberspace. Digital processes, such as those of providers of critical national infrastructure, but also those of large and small organisations and members of the public, use the services and products of globally operating companies.
The fact that digital processes can make use of cyberspace and are intertwined with it has brought many benefits and continues to offer opportunities. On the other hand, it also poses a risk. The downside of this intertwining is complexity, dependence and vulnerability to misuse and system failure. Cyber incidents can therefore strike at the heart of our society and paralyse it for a short or long time. The security of cyberspace is therefore inextricably linked to national security.
'Cyberspace' is a complex concept, with no consensus on the key elements for its functioning. Critical processes that help shape cyberspace and some global ICT supply chains are important elements. For example, many organisations use cloud services from Amazon and Microsoft and software suites such as Microsoft Office
Technical layer of cyberspace vulnerable to system failure and misuse
Important elements for the functioning of cyberspace and the technical layer thereof are potentially vulnerable to system failure and/or misuse. Some examples are known of breaks in undersea cables that carry intercontinental internet traffic. These have led to (temporarily) reduced availability in the region where it occurred. An example of misuse is the interception of data traffic via undersea cables for intelligence gathering by state actors.
Violation of the technical layer can have an impact on national security. Suppose a core protocol were to be manipulated or some submarine cables sabotaged. This can then quickly and on a large scale - through the so-called cascade effect - affect some national security interests: economic security, physical security and social and political stability. This can also affect the confidence of members of the public and organisations in cyberspace and digitisation.
Boosting resilience against system failure and misuse of elements of the technical layer is a limited possibility for individual states and organisations. One reason is that cyberspace is an ecosystem consisting of many components and in which many parties play a role. CSAN 2020 explained that there are various reasons why cyberspace security does not come about automatically. The risks to the entire cyberspace and their impact on society are also difficult to fathom. However, the design of the Internet does take into account vulnerabilities such as component failures. This ensures a high degree of redundancy and flexibility in the infrastructure. The design of the protocols also takes account of the failure of parts of the infrastructure.
Misuse of global ICT supply chains is common
As far as the process layer is concerned, the way organisations and people use cyberspace, it is misuse of global ICT supply chains that is of particular concern. The last three CSANs have highlighted the threat posed by an attack on ICT supply chains, termed ‘chains’ for convenience. Such an attack targets one or more vulnerabilities in chains rather than a specific process or organisation. An actor can affect many processes or organisations through weaknesses in chains. Conversely, these are intertwined with numerous chains and are therefore vulnerable to attacks through and within each of these chains. Those connections and thus vulnerabilities can be far-reaching. Large-scale system failure within or of chains is also conceivable. A small number of tech companies have a dominant market position for certain types of service. The chance of system failure may not be very high, but if there is a failure, it will affect the digital processes of many states and organisations.
Violation of certain global ICT supply chains can have an impact on national security by, for example, causing critical processes to become unavailable or to malfunction for longer or shorter periods of time. In such a scenario, organisations can no longer perform critical tasks such as distributing energy, carrying out financial transactions or providing education (or their performance may be more limited). Sensitive or vulnerable personal, economic or political information could become accessible to malicious parties. This could harm the Dutch economy or put the Netherlands at a disadvantage in international negotiations. Besides this direct impact, violations of cyberspace also have a wider impact. For example, a great deal of capacity and money must be devoted to investigating misuse and remedying it. In some cases, an entire infrastructure of organisations must be rebuilt. In the meantime, the extent to which actors are still present within the infrastructure of organisations and whether misuse is still possible is unknown. This may mean that analogue processes, which are often lacking or which may result in higher costs, must be used again. Violation can also affect the trust of members of the public and organisations in digital processes and possibly hinder further digitisation.
Boosting resilience against violation of ICT supply chains is limited in practice. Digital processes are intertwined with and make use of various complex chains. There is a lot of ‘low-hanging fruit’ for attackers that organisations are not always aware of until things go wrong. If there is any risk assessment of third parties, it does not guarantee that they will not be misused indirectly. Moreover, nobody bears full responsibility for the security of the entire chain and the chain is not transparent. Within this framework, cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier said: ‘We can't trust anyone, yet we have no choice but to trust everyone’.