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Trends in Security Information
The HSD Trendmonitor is designed to provide access to relevant content on various subjects in the safety and security domain, to identify relevant developments and to connect knowledge and organisations. The safety and security domain encompasses a vast number of subjects. Four relevant taxonomies (type of threat or opportunity, victim, source of threat and domain of application) have been constructed in order to visualize all of these subjects. The taxonomies and related category descriptions have been carefully composed according to other taxonomies, European and international standards and our own expertise.
In order to identify safety and security related trends, relevant reports and HSD news articles are continuously scanned, analysed and classified by hand according to the four taxonomies. This results in a wide array of observations, which we call ‘Trend Snippets’. Multiple Trend Snippets combined can provide insights into safety and security trends. The size of the circles shows the relative weight of the topic, the filters can be used to further select the most relevant content for you. If you have an addition, question or remark, drop us a line at info@securitydelta.nl.
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Means and targets used by state actors to achieve theirs objectives
Means used by state actors: seven categories
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Influencing and interference (including disinformation). This includes hacking and leaking; covertly influencing individuals, democratic processes, political decision-making; using coercion (such as threats, blackmail, extortion or physical violence) against individuals; influencing and censoring scientific research.
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Espionage, both cyber and physical, including economic espionage.
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(Cyber) preparatory acts for and actual disruption and sabotage.
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Military activities, such as intimidation and show of force through arms races, large-scale exercises, military interventions in third countries, deployment of unrecognisable troops.
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The use of economic instruments, such as takeovers and investments, but also the exploitation of strategic dependencies as a means of exerting economic pressure.
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Diplomatic and international-political activities, for example, the use of obstructive power in international forums to block unwelcome decisions.
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Legal activities and/or lawfare, in which (inter)national law and legal systems are used to gain the greatest possible personal advantage, even if this is very much against the spirit of the law.
Targets of state actors: fifteen categories
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Diaspora, i.e. population groups that originate from another country and are still seen and treated as subjects by the country of origin.
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Faith communities.
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Groups and/or individuals susceptible to polarising messages, such as groups with strong anti-sentiment (e.g. against the Dutch government).
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Targets of opportunity: people who consciously or unconsciously allow themselves to be used.
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High potentials: people with the potential to reach knowledge or influential positions.
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Institutions and officials of our democratic constitutional state, at national and local level.
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Democratic processes, such as elections and referendums.
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Advisory bodies, which have a role in political decision-making through research and advice.
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Educational institutions.
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Research community, knowledge institutions and think tanks.
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Civil society, ranging from media to sports associations.
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International organisations based in the Netherlands.
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The private sector (and top sectors).
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Critical national infrastructure (plus suppliers).
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International frameworks that are crucial for the Netherlands, such as the EU, NATO and the UN.
The first three categories lend themselves perfectly to the use of digital resources. Influencing and interference largely take place in the information domain, which is digitalised in the form of, for example, online platforms and social media. This facilitates the use of means of influence such as the creation and/or dissemination of disinformation, media campaigns, the dissemination of information to cause damage or harm people, or hack and leak actions. That the use of digital resources for espionage and (preparations for) sabotage is perfectly suitable and attractive no longer needs to be demonstrated. In its 2020 Annual Report, the AIVD concluded that espionage is a threat to Dutch economic security.
A state actor can use its resources against a wide range of possible targets: from local associations to international security organisations and from a single individual to entire communities. A prominent target type is the critical national infrastructure, which includes critical processes, services, suppliers and central government. What is striking is that digital sabotage (including preparatory acts) is mainly used against this type of target. It is important to note that, as yet, no manifestations of this have been seen in the Netherlands, but they have been seen in other Western and even European countries. In particular, there is a growing interest in exploiting vulnerable links in supply chains. Extensive digitisation and the limited existence of fall-back options increase vulnerability