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- Trend snippet: A complete research peeling off the vulnerabilities, (future) risks, and societal challenges for drug-related corruption at Schiphol Airport and Rotterdam Harbour
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The HSD Trendmonitor is designed to provide access to relevant content on various subjects in the safety and security domain, to identify relevant developments and to connect knowledge and organisations. The safety and security domain encompasses a vast number of subjects. Four relevant taxonomies (type of threat or opportunity, victim, source of threat and domain of application) have been constructed in order to visualize all of these subjects. The taxonomies and related category descriptions have been carefully composed according to other taxonomies, European and international standards and our own expertise.
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A complete research peeling off the vulnerabilities, (future) risks, and societal challenges for drug-related corruption at Schiphol Airport and Rotterdam Harbour
The key findings include:
- The main ports are vulnerable to corruption due to factors like large cargo flows, sophisticated logistics infrastructure, and connections to international drug trafficking networks.
- The corruption threats with the greatest potential impact are bribery in the law enforcement chain and corruption in the cargo handling and logistics processes.
- Experts assessed the resilience of existing policy instruments to mitigate these corruption threats, finding that more attention is needed on issues like blackmail and financial bribery in the logistics chain.
- The study used a National Risk Assessment methodology, relying heavily on expert consultation, to identify and prioritize the key corruption risks facing these critical transportation hubs.
In summary, the article provides a comprehensive overview of the corruption challenges at the heart of the Netherlands' major ports and the policy tools available to address them.
What makes Dutch main ports vulnerable to corruption? The study has produced an overview of the main contextual factors of the Port of Rotterdam and Schiphol Airport that make these main ports vulnerable to corruption. An extensive flow of goods with particularly vulnerable sectors Several organisational factors may increase the Port of Rotterdam and Schiphol Airport’s vulnerability to corruption. Existing research emphasised that the highly developed security of the main ports increases the likelihood of systematic infiltration attempts in the legal economy by organised crime groups. Furthermore, studies indicate that the increasing automation of logistics processes enhances the likelihood of organised crime groups attempting to breach information systems involved in the handling of goods. In the case of Schiphol, security is mainly focused on people and goods entering the airport. Conversely, checks on goods and people leaving Schiphol's premises are less extensive. Furthermore, inspection appears to be logistically complex for some cargo flows due to the nature of the products shipped. This is certainly the case for fruit, flowers or fish/meat, as these need to be handled as efficiently and quickly as possible due to their limited shelf life. Moreover, the flow of goods through Schiphol Airport is substantial, making it impossible to subject all shipments to a physical check. Therefore, customs operate on the basis of risk-based surveillance, according to which consignments that pose a risk based on available information are prioritised. Checking shipments is also complicated at the Port of Rotterdam for the same reasons. Due to the size of the cargo throughput, it is impossible for the competent authorities to check all incoming goods and 3 therefore use various methods to identify high-risk cargoes. Although this identification and control process is highly automated, several measures have been taken to reduce its vulnerability. Large-scale sites with excellent logistics and digital infrastructure Due to high-quality physical, digital and knowledge infrastructure in the Netherlands, the Dutch main ports are important hubs in the global economy and function as a gateway to the European market. Schiphol Airport is one of Europe's largest airports while the Port of Rotterdam is Europe's largest container and bulk port. However, their sophisticated facilities make these main ports attractive targets for organised crime groups looking to traffic illicit substances and goods such as drugs, thereby increasing corruption risks. While it is the case that some these illicit goods are intended for the domestic Dutch market, most drugs appear to be smuggled into the European hinterland via road, water, or rail links, which is relatively easy due to the Schengen Agreement and European Customs legislation. The economic importance of these main ports has led to the establishment of numerous businesses in and around the sites of Schiphol and Port of Rotterdam. In the past, it was sometimes unclear exactly how many companies had established themselves at Schiphol and how reliable these companies were. Currently, several initiatives are underway to gain better insight into this matter. As for the Port of Rotterdam, the vast size of the port area poses a challenge for authorities seeking to secure the area fully. In addition, the presence of many private companies, as well as the port’s proximity to the city of Rotterdam and excellent logistical connections with the European hinterland, also increases the port's vulnerability to criminal activity. Workplace conditions make main ports particularly vulnerable to corruption Furthermore, the Port of Rotterdam and Schiphol are also distinguished by some socio-cultural characteristics that may make the main ports particularly vulnerable to corruption. These include workplace culture, such as the degree of trust in management, the degree of social control and workload, as well as employees' social capital, and the degree of autonomy and mobility experienced by employees. At Schiphol Airport, the combination of tough working conditions and a shared socio-cultural background of employees appears to be a major risk factor. Research showed that this can at times create a culture that is difficult to penetrate and where willingness to report irregularities or offences is low. Furthermore, the use of temporary workers can also increase vulnerabilities, given that they are likely to feel less connected to the company and therefore more susceptible to criminal infiltration. In the port of Rotterdam, there is evidence that the automation of port work has affected the traditionally robust social controls that may act as a barrier to integrity violations. Research shows that this social control has mostly disappeared in the large, crowded and often chaotic areas of the port. On the other hand, social pressure in the workplace may actually increase the risk of corruption by creating reluctance to act as a whistleblower because of fear of social repercussions. Lastly, human resources policies can influence the vulnerability of certain professions to corruption. For instance, the distance between management and executive staff experienced by workers at the port may contribute to general job dissatisfaction. 4 Drug-related corruption in the main ports cannot be separated from the dynamics of international drug trafficking It is important to mention that the issue of drug-related corruption in the main ports should not be separated from the dynamics of international drug markets and the Dutch business climate for organised crime. Although criminals are active in the Netherlands partly because of the country’s excellent facilities and logistics infrastructure, they are not necessarily tied to specific main ports. Therefore, so-called displacement effects or ‘waterbed’ effects may be observed when barriers are erected against illegal activities in one main port, causing criminal groups to move to locations with fewer security measures. An example of this are indications that tighter controls in Rotterdam are causing drug traffickers to move from Rotterdam to other ports in the Netherlands or abroad.
Key insights from the study One of the main findings of this study is that experts rated corruption through bribery as a particularly important threat in both main ports. This underscores the substantial role that financial incentives play in corrupting individuals within the logistics chain and support services for the purpose of drug trafficking through main ports, which may provide important leads for policy development. Moreover, it is consistent with findings from previous studies on this topic. Existing literature consistently identifies the financial bribery of employees of public agencies as one of the most impactful corruption threats when it comes to facilitating drug-related crime. However, the results of our expert sessions also show that many policies have already been developed in this area for both main ports. Furthermore, they indicate that there are many measures already in place which aim at preventing, limiting and reducing bribery. This likely explains the relatively high estimated resilience of both Schiphol Airport and the Port of Rotterdam against this threat. Corruption through social pressures in the workplace, leading individuals not to fulfil their reporting obligations when they witness criminal actions, was also identified as a key threat for both main ports. At Schiphol, this was felt to be important primarily in the baggage handling department, where some have identified a culture of silence which can be enforced with harsh measures such as bullying, intimidation and violence. In the Port of Rotterdam, this dynamic was perceived to play out throughout the entire logistics chain of container terminals. This threat is not so much about active participation in corrupt activities, but about the limited willingness to report such behaviour or confront colleagues engaged in corruptive behaviour. The results of the expert meetings show that this ‘culture of looking away’ is seen as an important mechanism in the context of drug-related corruption. Where workplace culture includes strong social pressure, such integrity violations can occur more easily because other employees who witness these actions may do not report them out of fear for repercussions. Moreover, Schiphol Airport was considered by experts to be particularly vulnerable to corruption among key planners and brokers. In the Port of Rotterdam, resilience was rated lowest for blackmail and financial bribery in the logistics chain of goods towards the hinterlands. The heightened vulnerability attributed to these specific threats is not entirely unexpected, given that they transpire, at least in part, beyond the direct influence of the relevant main port authorities. Nevertheless, this discovery underscores the significance of pinpointing areas requiring heightened attention. It serves as a critical insight for potential future policy development, especially if subsequent research validates these findings. However, we advise caution in interpreting the ranking of threats. In our view, the quantitative assessments and subsequent ranking mainly indicate that a number of issues are of particular interest to the expert group. The average weighted impact scores were relatively close for both Schiphol Airport and the port of Rotterdam. The same applies to some extent to the estimation of the resilience of policy instruments; here too, as already noted, the scores for both main ports were close to each other. This could reflect a lack of distinction between actual corruption threats, but it could also be a result of the application of the methodology and the associated limitations of expert judgement.